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Abstract It is wholly uncontroversial that measurements or, more properly, proposi-
tions that are measurement reports are often paradigmatically good cases of proposi-
tions that serve the function of evidence. In normal cases, it is also obvious that stating
such a report is an utterly pedestrian case of successful assertion. So, for example, there
is nothing controversial about the claims that (1) a proposition to the effect that a
particular thermometer reads 104 °C when properly used to determine the temperature
of a particular patient is evidence that the patient in question has a fever and (2) there is
nothing wrong with asserting the proposition that a particular thermometer reads
104 °C for appropriate reasons of communication, etc. when the thermometer has been
properly used to determine the temperature of a particular patient. Here, it will be
shown that Timothy Williamson’s commitments to a number of principles about
knowledge and assertion imply that a whole class of utterly ordinary statements like
these that are used as evidence are not really evidence because they are not knowledge
and so are (perversely) unassertable according to his principled commitments. This
paper deals primarily with the second of these two problems, and an alternative account
of the norms of assertion is introduced which allows for the assertability of such
measurement reports.
1 Introduction
It is wholly uncontroversial that measurements—or, more properly, propositions that
are measurement reports—are often paradigmatically good cases of propositions that
serve the function of evidence. In normal cases, it is also obvious that stating such a
report is an utterly pedestrian case of successful assertion. So, for example, there is
nothing controversial about the following claims: (1) that a proposition to the effect that
a particular thermometer reads 104 °C when properly used to determine the temperature
of a particular patient is evidence that the patient in question has a fever and (2) that
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there is nothing wrong with asserting the proposition that a particular thermometer
reads 104 °C for appropriate reasons of communication, etc. when the thermometer has
been properly used to determine the temperature of a particular patient. Here, it will be
shown that Timothy Williamson’s commitments to a number of principles about
knowledge and assertion imply that a whole class of utterly ordinary statements like
these that are used as evidence are not really evidence because they are not knowledge
and so are (perversely) unassertable according to his principled commitments. This
paper deals primarily with the second of these two problems, and an alternative account
of the norms of assertion is introduced which allows for the assertability of such
measurement reports.1
2 The Commonality Thesis
Recently, there has been much interest in the topic of the norm(s) of assertion and this
interest drives from a variety of sources. The debate concerning pragmatic encroach-
ment on knowledge is one such source, and the debate about whether or not pragmatic
factors affect whether an agent knows or does not know involves the issue of the proper
norm for practical reasoning or acting. Those who endorse pragmatic encroachment on
knowledge have typically defended the view that the proper norm of practical reasoning
is knowledge. In other words, they defend the knowledge norm for practical reason.
This in turn suggests that the proper norm for assertion is knowledge via what is known
as the commonality thesis. The commonality thesis is just the idea that the proper norm
of assertion is the same as the proper norm of practical reasoning.2 Timothy Williamson
in particular has defended the commonality thesis.3 So, for Williamson, the proper
norm of both practical reasoning and assertion is knowledge, and, in its most elemental
form, this principle is the following claim:
(KN-C) one should act on or assert a proposition only if it is known.
This is composed of the following two sub-principles:
(KN-PR) one should act on a proposition only if it is known, and
(KN-A) one should assert a proposition only if it is known.
Both the knowledge norm of assertion and the knowledge norm of practical
reasoning have been subjected to considerable criticism, even though they have also
been vigorously defended by some influential contemporary philosophers.4 Williamson
in particular defends the knowledge norm for assertion by appeal to its supposed
1 A solution to the first problem is presented in Shaffer (2015). It should also be noted here that no
consideration will be given here to alternate views of assertion extant in the literature. The purpose of this
paper is solely to engage with Williamson’s views and to advance an alternative consonant with the view of
assertion presented in Shaffer (2012a) and in Shaffer (2012b).
2 See Brown (2011).
3 Williamson (2000).
4 See, for example, Hawthorne (2004), Hawthorne Stanley (2008), Williamson (2000), and Williamson
(2005).
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explanatory power. More specifically, he argues that the knowledge norm of assertion is
the best explanation of the unassertability of sentences of the form Bp, but I do not
believe that p.^ In mounting this defense, Williamson claims that such Moorean
sentences are (1) unassertable and (2) that the best explanation of this fact is that
knowledge is the proper norm of assertion. Of course, Williamson notoriously has
much to say about the nature of knowledge itself as well.
3 Williamsonian Epistemology
The core thesis of Williamson’s (2000) radical knowledge-first epistemology is the
claim that one’s evidence is equivalent to what one knows. This thesis is widely known
as the BE = K^ thesis. Where BKSp^ signifies that S knows that p and BESp^ signify that
p is evidence for S, this thesis can be regimented as follows:
W1ð Þ ESp≡KSp:
Moreover, according to Williamson, knowledge is the most general factive mental state
operator. This is just to say that if a proposition is known, then it is true. This is just the
familiar and orthodox factivity condition for knowledge. It can be simply stated as follows:
W2ð Þ KSp→p:
W1 and W2 entail is the following very interesting claim:
W3ð Þ ESp→p:
W3 is a factivity condition for evidence. In addition, Williamson (2000) is also
committed to the safety condition for knowledge. The safety condition can be under-
stood simply as follows: If S knows that p, then S could not easily have falsely believed
that p. Safety can be made more precise as follows:
W4ð Þ wi⊨Kspð Þ→: < wi > ⊨ Bsp&:pð Þ½ :
Here, Bwi^ is world i, BKsp^ represents that S knows that p, B<wi>^ is the set of
worlds sufficiently close to wi, and BBsp^ represents that S believes that p. So
understood, W4 is the claim that if S knows that p at wi, then in worlds sufficiently
similar to wi (including wi), S does not believe that p when p is false. This regimen-
tation of the safety condition captures the core idea of that condition well.
In virtue of Williamson’s explicit commitment to W1 as the core of his knowledge-
first epistemology and his commitment W4, he is also committed to the following
principled claim about evidence:
If p is evidence for S, then S could not easily have falsely believed that p.
This derived principle will turn out to be crucial for one horn of the dilemma
involved in the argument that follows. Formally, it can be regimented as follows:
W5ð Þ wi⊨Espð Þ→: < wi > ⊨ Bsp&:pð Þ½ ;
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Let us then turn to the crux of the issue to be raised here.
4 Measurement Reports, Evidence, and Assertability.
The problem to be raised here for Williamson is that many cases involving the use of
propositions that are the reports of measurements as evidence appear to be paradigmatic
cases of good evidence, but they cannot be evidence at all according to his various
commitments and they turn out also to be perversely unassertable. But, this conclusion
is wildly implausible and so, as we shall see, we can build a reductio of his views. First,
we can straightforwardly agree that measurement and the reports of such measurements
are inexact. In order to account for this inexactness, we must either treat such propo-
sitions as false but approximately true or treat as true in some qualified manner. This is
the key dilemma in the argument to be made here. On the one hand, if such measure-
ment reports are false but approximately true, then by W3, they cannot be evidence. By
W1, they are not knowledge, and by KN-A, they are either defective assertions or not
assertions at all. On the other hand, if measurement reports are qualified but true, then
there will always be close possible worlds where the proposition that is the report of a
measurement will be false but still believed. In virtue of W5, all such propositions will
not be evidence and are not knowledge. By KN-A, they are then either defective
assertions or not assertions at all. So, not matter how we regiment and understand
measurement reports, they are either defective assertions or not assertions at all given
Williamson’s views on knowledge and assertion. In other words, all such propositions
are not evidence and are unassertable. But this is simply absurd and so we have a
reductio. In order to flesh out this argument, let us look a bit more closely at the both
horns of this dilemma.
5 False But Approximately True
Let us address the first horn of the dilemma raised here via the consideration of two
illustrative examples, and let us be clear that according to this interpretation of the
inexactness of measurements, they are false but approximately true. Millikan’s famous
oil drop experiments were conducted in order to empirically determine the charge on an
electron, e, and to determine that electrical charge was quantized in discreet units rather
than continuous.5 Let us then consider the manner in which this experiment was
performed in the effort to confirm the claim that electrical charge is quantized. To
begin, the value of e is theoretically determined as follows. Where NA is Avogadro’s
constant and F is Faraday’s constant, the value of e is given by the equation e = F/NA.
But, Millikan’s experimental procedure to empirically determine the value of e was
quite complex and involved spraying small electrically charged drops of oil in an
electric field produced in an ingenious apparatus. This apparatus involved a parallel
pair of horizontal metal plates across which a uniform electrical filed was created. Oil
drops were allowed to fall and then rise due to the effect of the electrical field produced
in Millikan’s apparatus. These droplets move at a rate determined by gravity, the
5 See Franklin (1997), Shaffer (2013), and Shaffer (2015).
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viscosity of the air, and the electric force involved. The gravitational and viscous forces
on the oil drops are calculated based on the size and velocity of the oil drops. As a
result, the electric force on the oil drops can thereby be determined. Since this electric
force is the product of the electric charge and the electric field involved, the electric
charge of the oil drops can also be determined. By measuring the electrical charges of
many oil drops, Millikan was able to determine both the value of e, and that the charges
are all integer multiples of e (i.e., that they are quantized). Determining a relatively
exact value of e involved measuring the following parameters involved in the exper-
iments using his apparatus as accurately as possible: temperature, pressure, voltage, the
coefficient of viscosity of air, the density of clock oil, the value of the gravitational
constant, and the times of rise and fall of the oil drops.
The important point to note here is that all of Millikan’s measurements were—and
still do—constitute evidence for the claim that electrical charge is quantized. But, the
measured quantities used to indirectly determine the value of e are all approximations.
This is due to the measurement errors inherent in determining the values of the relevant
parameters in the experiment. More accurate and contemporary experimental methods
have determined that the value of e is 1.602176487(40) × 10−19 C. But, Millikan’s
experiment determined the value of e to be 1.5924(17) × 10−19 C on the basis of sets
of measurements generated by a significant number of experimental runs. So, the
evidence that confirms the claim that electric charge is quantized is only
approximately true, and this is due to the inexactness of the various methods of
measurement used in the oil-drop experiment. So, it would appear to be the case that
some propositions can be evidence even though they are only approximately true. This
further entails both that false propositions can constitute evidence because all approx-
imately true propositions are false.
A more mundane example of this aspect of evidential practice and its methodolog-
ical significance can be seen in the following admittedly hypothetical but perfectly
ordinary case. Suppose that Jane is attempting to move his couch into her new
apartment. So, let us suppose that she measures the width of the couch and the width
of the entry door to her apartment using a standard tape measure. Suppose that she
determines via this method that the door is 3.5 ft wide and that the couch is 4.5 ft wide.6
On this basis, she might reasonably conclude that the couch will not fit through the
doorway. Suppose also however that, due to the inexactness of Jane’s measurements,
the door is not exactly 3.5 ft wide. Suppose that it is really 3.51246 ft wide. Suppose
also that the couch is not exactly 4.5 ft wide and that it is really 4.489 ft wide. As in our
scientific case, it should be clear that these figures are false but approximately true. As
in the case of Millikan’s oil drop experiment, those pieces of evidence are, nevertheless,
still very good evidence for the claim that the couch will not fit through the doorway.
So, as in the case of Millikan’s experiment, it would appear to be the case that some
propositions can be evidence even though they are only approximately true. Again, this
further entails that false propositions can constitute evidence and this is because all
approximately true propositions are false.
6 Let us also assume that this dimension of the couch is such that the couch cannot be manipulated so as to
reduce the width of the couch relative to the width of the door. So, for example, it cannot be tilted to fit it
through the door.
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However, in both cases Williamson is committed to the view the relevant proposi-
tions being used as evidence are not really evidence and that they are not even
assertable. Given Williamson’s principled commitments, the measurement report that
the value of e is 1.5924(17) × 10−19 C in the Millikan case is not evidence for the
quantization of charge because this is only approximately true and this measurement
report is not assertable because it is not known. This is the case because the
measurement report involved is only approximately true and all approximately true
propositions are false. So, by W3, this report is not evidence, by W1, it is not
knowledge, and by KN-A, any putative assertion to this effect is either a defective
assertion or not an assertion at all. The same thing goes for the Jane case. Her
measurements used to determine that the door is 3.5 ft wide and that the couch is
4.5 ft wide that are employed as putative evidence for the claim that that the couch will
not fit through the doorway are false but approximately true. By W3, these
measurement reports are not evidence, by W1, they are not knowledge, and by KN-
A, any putative assertions of these propositions are either defective assertions or not
assertions at all. But, of course, these conclusions are absurd.
6 True But Unsafe
Let us then turn to the other horn of the dilemma whereby the inexactness of
measurement is treated in terms of qualified truths. As we shall see, most propositions
that are the reports of measurement results are demonstrably unsafe so understood.
They are demonstrably unsafe because the justifiably believed measurement results
could almost always easily be false. So, they cannot constitute knowledge for
Williamson. Moreover, if W3 is true, then they are not actually evidence at all, and
by KN-A, the propositions that constitute measurement reports so understood are not
even assertable. But, this is absurdly skeptical stance to take with respect to the
evidentiary role of measurements in the sciences and more mundane epistemic pursuits.
Such a view simply does not reflect real epistemic practice. In such practice, we often
treat measurements as exceptionally good evidence and there is nothing wrong with
assertions of measurement results.
The problem with W5 is that for all (real) inexact measurement procedures, the
reports that serve as evidence could almost always easily have been falsely believed.
This can be easily established on the basis of the following considerations. Consider
measured values xi obtained on the basis of measurement procedure M for measurable
variable x. Let us suppose also that x1 is a bit of evidence for some theoretical claim T.
So, in w1, M yields value for x of x1. For any such case, there will be many very close
worlds that are nomically indistinguishable from w1, <w1>, where the agent making the
measurement, S, believes falsely that the value of x is x1. In these very close worlds,
there exist no more precise measurement procedures with respect to x (so they are
relevantly nomically similar to w1 in that specific respect) than exist in w1, but the real
values of x in those worlds will vary infinitesimally from what M tells us the value of x
is at w1, e.g., say the value of x at some member of <w1> is really x2 such that x2 = x1 +
.000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001. This response is
fully generalizable for any case of measurement, and by our construction, there will be
no nomically possible way to detect such possible but tiny errors. So, S could almost
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always easily have had a false belief about virtually any measurement report, and W5
will almost always be violated in cases where measurements serve as evidence.
One might respond to this criticism by claiming that measurement evidence really
involves propositions of the form Bx ± δ.^ But, this does not save the view. Once again,
consider measured values xi obtained on the basis of measurement procedure M for
measurable variable x. Let us suppose also that x1 is a bit of evidence for some theoretical
claim Tand that due to the nomic features of the worldw1 inwhichM is being employed,M
has a determined margin of error of ± δ. So, in w1, M yields value for x of x1 ± δ. For any
such case, there will be many very close worlds that are nomically indistinguishable from
w1, <w1>, where the agent making themeasurement, S, believes falsely that the value of x is
x1 ± δ. In these very close worlds, there exist no more precise measurement procedures with
respect to x (so they are again relevantly nomically similar to w1) than exist in w1, but the
real values of x in those worlds will vary infinitesimally from what M tells us the value of x
is at w1, e.g., say the value of x at somemember of <w1> is really x2 ± δ such that x2 = x1 +
.000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001. Here, we have to be
careful about interpreting these sorts of cases so as to be clear about the crux of the problem
here. The problem involves having the following very specific belief in w1, BS(v(x) = x1 ±
δ), while also, at some member of <w1>, BS(v(x) = x1 ± δ) even though it is false because
v(x) = x2 ± δ at that world. Of course, there will be arbitrarily many such worlds corre-
sponding to various miniscule deviations in the value of x from x1. It is crucial to see that in
this construction, there is an important variation in the value of x and its associated
uncertainty taken as a whole and these cases are not merely cases where at w1 BS(v(x) =
x1 ± δ) and the value of x at some member of <w1> is x2.
7 For if that was all that such cases
involved, S’s belief would be true at the posited member of <w1> if x2 – x1 > δ and we
would not have a clear violation of safety. But, according to safety, S does not know that
v(x) = x1 ± δ and it cannot be evidence for Swhenwe see that the case involves BS(v(x) = x1
± δ) at w1 while both BS(v(x) = x1 ± δ) and v(x) = x2 ± δ are true at some member of <w1>.
Again, this response is fully generalizable for any case of measurement, and in our
construction, there will be no nomically possible way to detect such possible errors. So, S
could almost always easily have had a false belief about virtually any measurement report
and W5 will almost always be violated in cases where measurements serve as evidence.
A second response one might make to this criticism also involves claiming that
measurement evidence takes the form of propositions of the form Bx ± δ.^ Given this
line of thinking, one might suggest that worlds where the value of x cannot be
discriminated from worlds where the value of x is infinitesimally different are all
included in the range of x. Consequently, the propositions that report measurements
and serve as evidence in scientific practice are in fact true. However, this maneuver
does not work to block the safety version of the argument form approximation because
we can simply shift the locus of the criticism just introduced to δ itself. Once more,
consider measured values xi obtained on the basis of measurement procedure M for
measurable variable x. Let us suppose also that x1 is a specific bit of evidence for some
theoretical claim T and that due to the nomic features of the world w1 in which M is
being employed, M has a determined margin of error of ± δ. So, in w1, M yields a range
of values for x, specifically x1 ± δ. As in our previous cases, for any such case, there
7 This effectively deals with the sort of predictable response Williamson might make to this case along the
lines suggested in Williamson 2011.
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will be many very close worlds that are nomically indistinguishable from w1, <w1>,
where the agent making the measurement, S, believes falsely that the value of x is x1 ±
δ. In these very close worlds, there exist no more precise measurement procedures with
respect to x than exist in w1, but the real values of x ± δ in those worlds will vary
infinitesimally from what M tells us the range of values x has at w1, e.g., say the range
of values of x at some member of <w1> is really x1 + δ′ where δ′ = δ +
.000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001. Once again, this
response is fully generalizable for any non-ideal case of measurement, there will be no
nomically possible way to detect such possible but tiny errors in the range of values
determined for x at that world. So, again, S could almost always easily have had a false
belief about virtually any measurement report, and W5 will almost always be violated
in cases where measurements serve as evidence. So, this second response also fails to
block the criticism raised here.
The result then is robust, and the main contention made here is that Williamson
views imply a totally implausible views of measurement evidence and of the
assertability of evidence reports, provided one grants the probity of the use of mea-
surement evidence as it is used in scientific practice whether we treat measurement
reports as approximate truths or as qualified truths. It follows then that one or more of
the principles he endorses that were noted above is false and that we ultimately need to
examine some related principles that might be appealed to in order to avoid this
implausible result. Let us begin by looking a bit more closely at KN-A and
Williamson’s argument for that principle. This is important because if KN-A can be
replaced with an account of the norm of assertion that renders measurement reports
assertable, then we do not really need to identify the specific epistemic principle(s) that
should be rejected in order to rescue the assertability of such claims. It may very well be
true that one or more of Williamson’s epistemic commitments needs to go, but as things
stand here, we can avoid confronting that problem here.
7 Rejecting KN-A: Rescuing the Assertability of Measurement Reports
Why is the alleged unassertability of Moorean sentences supposed to support the
knowledge norm of assertion? This is supposed to be the case because if asserting that
p is governed by the norm of knowledge, then one should assert p, if and only if, it is
true. If one also accepts the view that knowledge entails belief one should assert that p,
if and only if, p is believed. This entails that to assert a Moorean sentence is to violate
the knowledge norm of assertion and one ought not to assert that p when p is not
believed. This is because in such a case, it cannot be known. Consider the claim that
Obama is the President of the USA in 2012 and Howard’s attempt to assert the
following compound proposition:
(O) Obama is the President of the USA in 2012, but I do not believe it.8
To this end, let us suppose that Howard utters the English sentence BObama is the
President of the United States in 2012, but I do not believe it.^ What Howard is saying
8 This case was first introduced in Shaffer (2012b).
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is widely supposed to be paradoxically odd—as originally noticed by Moore.
Williamson alleges that this is the case because Howard is violating the knowledge
norm of assertion. Asserting O involves the assertion of a compound proposition
composed of two component propositions:
(OP1) Obama is the President of the USA in 2012.
(OP2) I do not believe that Obama is the President of the USA in 2012.
In attempting to assert O, Howard’s assertion of OP2 conflicts with his assertion that
OP1. Given this view if O is properly asserted, then both OP1 and OP2 are known.
However, knowing OP1 implies the negation of OP2. So, according to Williamson’s
view, Howard is failing to make a real assertion. What he is saying does not meet the
standard for assertion because that standard is knowledge. So, according to Williamson,
such Moorean sentences are unassertable. This purported fact is supposed to be
explained by the knowledge norm of assertion.
There are a variety of criticisms that have been leveled against the knowledge norm
of practical reasoning. If the commonality thesis is true, then such criticisms implicate
the knowledge norm of assertion too. The most convincing of these criticisms concern
the claim that knowledge is necessary for action and these criticisms have then given
rise to a whole host of weaker suggestions concerning the proper norm for action.
Recently, the following alternative has been proposed account of the norm of practical
reasoning has been proposed. Where the choice is p-dependent,
(JBAT-PR) it is epistemically rational for S to employ p (appropriately) in S’s
practical reasoning only if:
(i-PR) it is at least the case that S is justified in believing that p is approximately
true, and
(ii-PR) p is at least approximately true.9
This weaker view was proposed in light of counterexamples that implicate both the
knowledge norm and its other weaker cousins, such as those proposed by Neta and
Littlejohn.10 It is important to notice that the justified belief component of the left hand
side of the bi-conditional of JBAT-PR is qualified by an Bat least^ qualification with its
scope outside the doxastic operator. This is intentionally designed to capture the idea that
the norm of practical reasoning involves at least S being justified in her belief that p is
approximately true. This is then compatible with S’s being justified in her belief that p is
strictly true as well as her being justified in her belief that p is only approximately true.We
cannot just substitute S is justified in believing that p is at least approximately true for S is
justified in believing that p is true or S is justified in believing that p is approximately true
without running into problems as demonstrated in Shaffer 2012a, b, c. So that particular
qualification is crucial. In the other conjunct in the left hand side of the bi-conditional p’s
being at least approximately true means that p is true or that p is approximately true.
9 Shaffer (2012a).
10 See Neta (2009) and Littlejohn (2009).
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This weaker principle captures a much more reasonable sense of the epistemic
conditions on practical reasoning, and it has two important virtues. First, it gets us
the correct result in a wide variety of allegedly problematic cases. Second, this weak
principle of the epistemic conditions on practical reasoning respects what a number of
variously motivated philosophers have convincingly argued about epistemic rationality
and inexact truth to a much greater extent than do any of the other proposals. This is
interesting because the parties involved in the debate about the knowledge norm of
practical reasoning have by and large simply assumed some implicit philosophical or
folk theory of rationality that ignores the practical rationality of inexact, partial, or
approximate truths. But, recently and compellingly, some more perspicacious thinkers
have argued that rational thinking and acting involve the use of approximations,
idealizations, and/or inexact truths.11 We are less than perfectly rational, and the debates
between the various defenders of the heuristic and bias tradition, the ecological
rationality model, and more traditional views attest to this.12
The details of these debates are not important here, but what they strongly suggest
collectively is that we sometimes base both practical and theoretical reasoning on
propositions that are not exactly true and that we can be efficient problem solvers and
deliberators even though we do not reason in maximally accurate ways on the basis of
strict truths.13 We often trade degrees of accuracy with respect to truth for things like
efficiency, ease of use, and generality without compromising rationality or success.
Given this perspective, it is not always irrational to employ approximate, partial, or
inexact truths in our practical reasoning. JBAT-PR reflects this whereas the stronger
alternatives alluded to above cannot accommodate this possibility. So JBAT-PR is more
realistic on this count, and what is interesting for the issue at hand is that if some weaker
analog of the commonality thesis is true and JBAT-PR is the proper norm for acting, then
JBAT-A is the proper norm for asserting. This can be understood as follows:
(JBAT-A) It is epistemically rational for S to assert p only if:
(i-A) it is at least the case that S is justified in believing that p is approximately
true, and
(ii-A) p is at least approximately true.
It is crucial to note then that if JBAT-A is the proper norm for assertion, Moorean
sentences can be assertable. As a result, Williamson’s defense of the knowledge norm
of assertion on the basis that it best explains the unassertability of Moorean sentences is
a failure.
The following sort of case demonstrates that there are, in fact, assertable Moorean
sentences:
MATH1: Joe is an elementary school mathematics teacher and he is teaching his
students about geometry. In the course of teaching his students how to calculate
11 See, for example, Elgin (1996), Cartwright (1983), Millgram (2009), Wilson (2006), and Wimsatt (2007).
12 See, for example, Elio (2002), Piattei-Palmarini (1994), Gerd Gigerenzer (2000), Shaffer (2009), and
Shaffer (2012c).
13 See Shaffer (2009).
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the area of a circle via the use of the equation A = πr2 he tells his students the
value of π. Specifically, he says that π = 3.14159. Joe works out several examples
and the students learn how to do this for themselves.
MATH1 is an utterly pedestrian and realistic case, and in MATH1, Joe asserts that
π = 3.14159 via his uttering the English sentence Bthe value of pi is 3.14159.^ Strictly
speaking, this is false. However, it is close enough to the truth for the purposes of Joe
and his students. According to defenders of the knowledge norm of assertion, Joe is
violating the proper norm of assertion. So, he is either acting inappropriately or failing
to make an assertion. Of course, neither of these options is at all plausible. Joe is
asserting a proposition in a perfectly ordinary sense and his assertion seems entirely
appropriate in the context described. He is making an assertion that involves a not
exactly true proposition, and this seems entirely reasonable. So, there is clearly
something wrong with the knowledge norm of assertion. But, it is not a case where
one can reasonably bite the bullet and claim that Joe’s behavior is epistemically
irrational, as might be the case if he were baldly asserting a falsehood that was not
approximately true. So, it seems to be the case that it can be epistemically rational to
assert some falsehoods. Consider the following slight modification of MATH1:
MATH2: Joe is an elementary school mathematics teacher and he is teaching his
students about geometry. In the course of teaching his students how to calculate
the area of a circle via the use of the equation A = πr2 he tells his students the
value of π. Specifically, he says that π = 3.14159. Joe works out several examples
and the students learn how to do this for themselves. After class he winks at his
best student Jane, who is aware that his assertion bout the value of pi is only an
approximation, and says Bthe value of pi is 3.14159, but I don’t believe it.^
The Moorean sentence uttered in MATH2 has the supposed air of paradox about it
that many have attributed to Moorean sentences, but this is only a prima facie problem
given JBAT-A.14 If it is epistemically appropriate to assert approximately true propo-
sitions that one is at least justified in believing to be approximately true, then there is
nothing wrong with Joe’s assertion in MATH2. We can work this out in more detail as
follows. In MATH2, Joe is attempting to assert this compound proposition:
(C) The value of pi is 3.14159, but I do not believe it.
Asserting C involves the assertion of a compound proposition constituted by these
propositions:
(CP1) The value of pi is 3.14159.
(CP2) I do not believe that the value of pi is 3.14159.
14 One might be tempted to claim that the prima facie assertability of the cases appealed to here has something
to do with contextual factors and that this does not apply in ordinary, more mundane, contexts. This is an
interesting view that is worth exploring further, but all that is necessary for the point of this paper is that the
assertability of claims like measurement reports in the context of the sciences is plausible.
Rescuing the Assertability of Measurement Reports
In attempting to assert C, Joe’s asserting CP1 might initially appear to conflict with
his assertion of CP2, but this conflict vanishes when the assertion is understood in
terms of JBAT-A. If C is properly asserted and JBAT-A is true, there is nothing wrong
with Joe’s assertion. Both CP1 and CP2 are at least approximately true, and it is at least
the case that Joe is justified in believing that they are approximately true. CP1 is
approximately true and Joe is justified in believing that it is approximately true. CP2 is
true and he is justified in believing that it is true. He does not really believe that the
value of pi is, strictly speaking, 3.14159. So, the context of the assertion of CP1 in
MATH2 renders that assertion epistemically rational, despite its being an approxima-
tion, and this is fully compatible with the simultaneous epistemically rational assertion
of CP2. In virtue of JBAT-A, Joe is making a real and fully coherent assertion of C,
despite its superficial paradoxical character. As a result, neither Williamson’s claim that
Moorean sentences are unassertable nor his claim that the unassertability of Moorean
sentences is (best) explained by the knowledge norm of assertion is compelling. It is
simply false that all Moorean sentences are unassertable and the knowledge norm
cannot be the best explanation of the unassertability of such sentences.
What is of greatest importance here is that JBAT-A can be used to rescue the
assertability of measurement reports both if they are false but approximately true and
if they are true but qualified. So, while the dilemma introduced earlier shows that there
is something wrong with Williamson’s epistemic commitments qua the evidential role
of measurement reports and that one or more of the epistemic principle he endorses
should be rejected, we do not have to decide what precisely to so about this issue in
order to rescue the assertability of measurement reports.15 All that we need to do to
accomplish this aim is to reject KN-A and replace it with JBAT-A. This is reasonable
because a principled argument in favor of JBAT-A has been provided here. So all that
remains to be done is to show how JBAT-A implies the assertability of measurement
reports like those discussed above. It turns out that this is the case both where such
reports are interpreted as false but approximately true and where they are interpreted as
true but qualified.
First, according to JBAT-A, false but approximately true propositions that are
justifiably believed to be approximately true are thus assertable because they are at
least approximately true. So, there is no problem with the assertability of measurement
reports like the claim that the value of e is 1.5924(17) × 10−19 C in the Millikan case if
we interpret such a claim as false but approximately true. That the value of e is
1.5924(17) × 10−19 C is at least approximately true and it is justifiably believed to be
so in the case described. The same thing goes for the Jane case. On this interpretation of
measurement reports, the reports that the door is 3.5 ft wide and that the couch is 4.5 ft
wide that are employed as putative evidence for the claim that that the couch will not fit
through the doorway are false but approximately true. Thus, they are at least
approximately true and they are justifiably believed to be approximately true. So,
according to JBAT-A, they are assertable. Of course, there will then be very many
similar cases of perfectly normal measurement reports that are assertable in the same
way and for the same reasons.
Second, according to JBAT-A, true qualified propositions (even if they are unsafe)
that are justifiably believed to be at least approximately true will also be assertable
15 Again, this issue is treated in Shaffer (2015).
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because they are at least approximately true. So, there is no problem with the
assertability of measurement reports like the claim that the value of e is 1.5924(17) ×
10−19 C in the Millikan case if we interpret such a claim as a qualified truth. That the
value of e is 1.5924(17) × 10−19 C is then at least approximately true and it is justifiably
believed to be so in the case described. Again, the same thing goes for the Jane case. On
this interpretation of the measurement reports, the reports that the door is 3.5 ft wide
and that the couch is 4.5 ft wide that are employed as putative evidence for the claim
that that the couch will not fit through the doorway are qualified truths that are unsafe.
Thus, they are then at least approximately true and they are justifiably believed to be
approximately true in this case. So, according to JBAT-A, they are assertable and there
will be very many similar cases of perfectly normal measurement reports that are
assertable in the same way and for the same reasons. So, whatever we say about the
locus of the problem of measurement reports in terms of Williamson’s epistemic
commitments and their function as evidence, we can avoid the problem of their
putative unassertability by replacing KN-A with JBAT-A, and there are compelling
independent reasons that favor JBAT-A over KN-A in any case.
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